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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Timothy Salas, Jr., appeals from the judgment entered upon his conditional guilty
plea to trafficking heroin and, on appeal, challenges the district court’s denial of his motion
to suppress evidence obtained after a police officer conducted a traffic stop. Salas argues
that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the traffic stop
violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On July 5, 2016, at approximately 9:30 in the morning, Officer Gideon Roberts of
the Idaho State Police “was on U.S. Highway 95 near Milepost 318 . . . running stationary
radar in the median, or a crossover section.” (Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.5, L.24 – p.6 L.14; p.8,
Ls.10-21. 1) After pulling out of the median and starting to head southbound on the
highway, Officer Roberts noticed a silver Cadillac Seville in front of him. (Prelim. Hr’g
Tr., p.9, L.16 – p.10, L.9.) The silver car “suddenly changed lanes from the left lane to the
right lane right directly in front of [a] semi.” (Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.10, Ls.10-22.) Officer
Roberts saw that the silver car did not use its turn signal at any time during the lane change.
(Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.10, L.23 – p.11, L.1.)
Officer Roberts conducted a traffic stop of the silver car. (Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.12,
Ls.18-23.) He explained to the driver that he initiated the traffic stop because the driver
failed to use his turn signal. (Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.13, Ls.4-7; State’s Exhibit A at 09:28:54
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The preliminary hearing transcript can be found on pages 130-71 of the clerk’s record.
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– 09:29:14.2) The driver of the silver car responded “that’s my fault.” (State’s Exhibit A
at 09:29:14 – 09:29:15.)
Officer Roberts identified the driver of the car as Timothy Salas, Jr., based on
Salas’s driver’s license. (Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.13, Ls.11-21.) Salas “appeared highly
nervous, much more so than just a regular traffic stop.” (Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.14, Ls.1-8.)
Because “[t]here was a very faint odor of raw marijuana coming from the vehicle,” Officer
Roberts contacted dispatch and requested a K-9 unit. (Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.14, Ls.12-16;
p.15, Ls.6-13.)
In a conversation that took place after the K-9 unit had arrived on the scene, “Salas
admitted to [Officer Roberts] that he was in possession of a marijuana blunt or cigarette.”
(Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.18, Ls.16-21.)

Based on Salas’s confession, Officer Roberts

“performed a search of Mr. Salas to locate the marijuana blunt.” (Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.18,
L.24 – p.19, L.3.) Officer Roberts “located in Mr. Salas’ front left pocket a small paper
bag. And inside that small paper bag was a small plastic baggy, or the corner of a, perhaps,
larger baggy that was tied off. And that baggy contained heroin.” (Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.19,
Ls.16-22.) Officer Roberts also recovered marijuana from Salas’s waistband. (Prelim.
Hr’g Tr., p.20, Ls.5-9.)
The state charged Salas with one count of trafficking heroin. (R., p.59.) Salas
moved to suppress the drug evidence on the bases that Officer Roberts’s initial seizure of
Salas and the length of time between the stop and the search violated the U.S. and Idaho
constitutions. (R., pp.82-89.) The state presented the district court with a transcript of
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All citations to State’s Exhibit A are to the time stamp in the top left corner of the video.
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Officer Roberts’s testimony from the preliminary hearing as well as his dash cam video of
the traffic stop. (R., pp.122-71; 7/20/2017 Tr., p.7, L.9 – p.8, L.9.)
The district court denied Salas’s motion to suppress the drug evidence. (R., p.182.)
The district court acknowledged that the video “is not dispositive of whether the signal
light was flashing or not,” but recognized “that the trooper is in a unique position to have
actually observed the traffic on the roadway.” (R., pp.179-80.) Based on Officer Roberts’s
testimony that Salas failed to use his traffic signal, the district court found that “the State
has established the trooper has reasonable suspicion for the stop.” (R., pp.180-81.) The
district court also found that, “[b]ased upon the totality of the circumstances, law
enforcement did not impermissibly expand the scope of the traffic stop.” (R., pp.181-82.)
After the district court denied his motion to suppress, Salas entered a conditional
guilty plea to the charge of trafficking heroin. (R., pp.190-96.) The district court sentenced
Salas to five years’ imprisonment with three years fixed but stayed Salas’s sentence
pending his appeal. (R., pp.213-16.) Salas timely appealed. (R., pp.219-23.)

3

ISSUE
Salas states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Salas’s motion to suppress?
(Appellant’s brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Salas failed to show that the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress drug evidence where the officer testified he conducted the traffic stop after seeing
Salas fail to use his turn signal when changing lanes on the highway?

4

ARGUMENT
Salas Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
The district court correctly found that Salas’s failure to use his turn signal when

changing lanes on the highway gave Officer Roberts reasonable suspicion to conduct the
traffic stop. In the face of Officer Roberts’s unequivocal testimony that he saw Salas fail
to use his turn signal, Salas’s only argument on appeal is that Officer Roberts’s testimony
is not credible. 3 (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-9.) That argument fails because credibility
determinations are reserved for the district court, who credited Officer Roberts’s testimony.
Even setting that aside, nothing in the record contradicts Officer Roberts’s testimony, and
Salas’s admission that he did, in fact, fail to use his turn signal corroborates Officer
Roberts’s testimony. Salas’s failure to use his turn signal on the highway violated Idaho
law and therefore gave Officer Roberts reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop.

B.

Standard Of Review
A district court’s order resolving a motion to suppress is reviewed “using a

bifurcated standard of review.” State v. Huffaker, 160 Idaho 400, 404, 374 P.3d 563, 567
(2016). “This court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous, but may freely review the trial court’s application of constitutional principles in
light of those facts.” Id.

3

Salas did not argue in his opening brief that the district court erred in finding that the
officers did not impermissibly expand the scope of the traffic stop. He has thus forfeited
that issue on appeal. See State v. Baxter, 163 Idaho 231, ___, 409 P.3d 811, 815 n.4 (2018)
(citing Liponis v. Bach, 149 Idaho 372, 374, 234 P.3d 696, 698 (2010)).
5

Salas asks this Court to overrule the litany of cases that have used this standard of
review for decades 4 and adopt a new standard for appeals from decisions on motions to
suppress. (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-7.) Salas argues that this Court should give deference
to a district court’s factual findings only when those findings are based on live testimony
presented to the district court. (Id.) His suggested standard is incompatible with the
standard routinely applied by Idaho’s appellate courts. See, e.g., State v. Fabeny, 132 Idaho
917, 920-21, 980 P.2d 581, 584-85 (Ct. App. 1999) (applying deferential standard to
district court’s factual findings where district court only “considered the preliminary
hearing transcript, two video tapes which recorded Fabeny’s waiver of his Miranda rights
and all or virtually all of his police interview, the transcripts of those videotapes, the
Miranda rights advisory form Fabeny signed, and Fabeny’s written statement”); State v.
Deisz, 145 Idaho 826, 827-29 & n.1, 186 P.3d 682, 683-85 & n.1 (Ct. App. 2008) (applying
deferential standard to district court’s factual findings where district court did not rely on
any live testimony).
Moreover, the cases Salas relies on are readily distinguishable. In each of the three
cases Salas relies on, the court was addressing a motion for a new trial, not a decision on a
motion to suppress. See State v. Lankford, 162 Idaho 477, 491-92, 399 P.3d 804, 818-19
(2017); Shabinaw v. Brown, 131 Idaho 747, 750-51, 963 P.2d 1184, 1187-88 (1998); Nafus
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See, e.g., State v. Weber, 116 Idaho 449, 451-52, 776 P.2d 458, 460-61 (1989) (“While
we agree that we should freely review whether the trial court correctly applied the law to
the facts, we defer to the trial court’s findings of fact, unless they are clearly erroneous.”);
State v. Medley, 127 Idaho 182, 185, 898 P.2d 1093, 1096 (1994) (“In reviewing an order
granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence, an appellate court will defer to the trial
court’s factual findings, unless the findings are clearly erroneous.”); State v. Donato, 135
Idaho 469, 470, 20 P.3d 5, 6 (2000) (same); State v. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d
1240, 1242 (2006) (same); State v. Hansen, 151 Idaho 342, 346, 256 P.3d 750, 754 (2011)
(same); State v. Chernobieff, 161 Idaho 537, 539, 387 P.3d 790, 792 (2016) (same).
6

v. Campbell, 96 Idaho 366, 368, 529 P.2d 266, 268 (1974). In each of the cases, the court
faced unique circumstances in which the trial judge deciding the motion for the new trial
did not actually preside over the trial. See Lankford, 162 Idaho at 491-92, 399 P.3d at 81819; Shabinaw, 131 Idaho at 750-51, 963 P.2d at 1187-88; Nafus, 96 Idaho at 368, 529 P.2d
at 268.

And, in each case, this Court expressly limited its holding to the unique

circumstances in front of it. See Lankford, 162 Idaho at 491-92, 399 P.3d at 818-19
(“Under these limited circumstances, this Court has determined that its role on appeal is to
freely review the evidence . . . .” (emphasis added)); Shabinaw, 131 Idaho at 750-51, 963
P.2d at 1187-88 (“Under these limited circumstances, this Court has determined that its
role on appeal is to freely review the evidence . . . .” (emphasis added)); Nafus, 96 Idaho
at 368, 529 P.2d at 268 (“In this condition of the case, we agree with counsel that it becomes
our duty to examine and weigh the evidence the same as the nisi prius court should do.”
(emphasis added)).
Salas’s distinguishable cases fall short of satisfying his burden for this Court to
overrule the numerous cases applying the traditional standard of review for decisions on
motions to suppress. See State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 4-5, 343 P.3d 30, 33-34 (2014)
(“Stare decisis requires that this Court follows controlling precedent unless that precedent
is manifestly wrong, has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or overruling that
precedent is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued
injustice.”). Accordingly, here, as in all appeals from a decision on a motion to suppress,
this Court must “accept[] the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous,
but may freely review the trial court’s application of constitutional principles in light of
those facts.” Huffaker, 160 Idaho at 404, 374 P.3d at 567.

7

C.

Officer Roberts Had Reasonable Suspicion That Salas Had Violated Idaho Law At
The Time Officer Roberts Conducted The Traffic Stop
The district court properly concluded that the traffic stop at issue in this case did

not violate the Fourth Amendment. 5 “Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may stop
a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior if there is a reasonable and articulable
suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws.” State v. Tregeagle, 161
Idaho 763, 766, 391 P.3d 21, 24 (Ct. App. 2017) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.
411, 417 (1981)). Reasonable suspicion “requires less than probable cause but more than
mere speculation or instinct on the part of the officer” and “must be evaluated upon the
totality of the circumstances at the time of the stop.” Id.
Idaho law requires individuals driving on the highway to signal for five continuous
seconds before changing lanes. See State v. Brooks, 157 Idaho 890, 894, 341 P.3d 1259,
1263 (Ct. App. 2014). Idaho Code Section 49-808(1) states that “[n]o person shall . . .
move a vehicle right or left upon a highway . . . without giving an appropriate signal.” And
§ 49-808(2) requires that, “[o]n controlled-access highways . . . the signal shall be given
continuously for not less than five (5) seconds.” In light of this statute, “failure to signal
for at least five seconds before changing lanes on a controlled-access highway provide[s]
[an] officer with reasonable suspicion to perform [a] stop.” Brooks, 157 Idaho at 894, 341
P.3d at 1263.

5

Although Salas made passing reference to Idaho’s constitution in the district court, he has
not substantively argued that Idaho’s constitution affords greater protection than the Fourth
Amendment in any way significant to this case. He has thus waived that argument. See
State v. Frederick, 149 Idaho 509, 513, 236 P.3d 1269, 1273 (2010); State v. Vasquez, 129
Idaho 129, 131-32, 922 P.2d 426, 428-29 (Ct. App. 1996).
8

The district court made a factual finding that Salas failed to signal for at least five
continuous seconds before changing lanes on the highway (R., pp.180-81), and this finding
is supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, Officer Roberts testified that he noticed
Salas’s car as he was pulling out of the median onto the highway behind Salas’s car.
(Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.10, Ls.1-9; p.25, Ls.1-6.) He testified that he was traveling in the same
lane as Salas, that he could see Salas’s vehicle “very” clearly, and that he could see both
taillights on Salas’s car. (Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.30, L.23 – p.31, L.1; p.35, L.17 – p.36, L.2.)
That testimony was corroborated by the video, which shows Officer Roberts pull out onto
the highway behind Salas’s car and nothing between the two cars blocking Officer
Roberts’s view. (State’s Exhibit A at 09:27:23 – 09:27:31.) Officer Roberts also testified
that Salas’s vehicle “suddenly changed lanes from the left lane to the right lane right
directly in front of [a] semi.” (Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.10, Ls.10-22.) And he unequivocally
testified that Salas did not use his turn signal “[d]uring that transition.” (Prelim. Hr’g Tr.,
p.10, L.23 – p.11, L.1; p.36, Ls.11-13.) Given this evidence, the district court did not err
in concluding Officer Roberts had reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop of Salas
for failing to signal for five continuous seconds before changing lanes on the highway. See
Brooks, 157 Idaho at 894, 341 P.3d at 1263.
Salas’s only response is to attack the credibility of Officer Roberts, arguing that
Officer Roberts could not possibly have seen Salas’s failure to use his turn signal.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.7-8.) But “[t]he credibility and weight to be given evidence is in the
province of the trial court,” State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 218, 984 P.2d 703, 706 (1999),
and the district court credited Officer Roberts’s testimony. (R., pp.180-81.)
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In any event, the record does not contradict Officer Roberts’s testimony. Salas
erroneously claims that the dash cam video “contradicts Trooper Roberts’ hearing
testimony” because it “demonstrates Trooper Roberts was not able to see the right-hand
turn signal from his distance.” (Appellant’s brief, p.8.) Salas’s argument rests entirely on
the premise that the dash cam video replicates exactly what Officer Roberts could see with
the naked eye at a distance of several hundred feet—a proposition that Salas has provided
no evidence to support and that the video itself betrays. The quality of the video is so low
that all of the street signs are completely illegible (see,
e.g.,
-- - State’s Exhibit A at 09:27:49,
09:28:04), including the sign immediately in front of Officer Roberts’s car when the video
starts (see State’s Exhibit A at 09:27:21). Given that such signs are legible to drivers on
the highway such as Officer Roberts, the only logical conclusion is that (unsurprisingly)
the video does not convey the same level of detail that Office Roberts could perceive as a
live witness present at the time the event in question occurred. (See R., p.180 (“While
video is often useful to give a real-world view of traffic stops, it is also true that it does not
replace the in-person observations of the people involved at the scene.”).) Because Officer
Roberts could perceive Salas’s car better than his dash cam, the dash cam video is of little
probative value—and certainly not dispositive—on the issue of whether Officer Roberts
could see Salas’s turn signal.
Moreover, Salas’s admission that he failed to use his turn signal corroborated
Officer Roberts’s testimony. After Officer Roberts informed Salas that he pulled Salas
over for failing to use his turn signal when he changed lanes, Salas responded “that’s my
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fault.” 6 (State’s Exhibit A at 09:29:14 – 09:29:15.) Because Salas’s admission that he did
not use his turn signal occurred after Officer Roberts conducted the traffic stop, the
admission is not directly relevant to whether Officer Roberts had reasonable suspicion. See
State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2008) (“Whether an officer
possessed reasonable suspicion is evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances
known to the officer at or before the time of the stop.”). But the admission is relevant to
rebut Salas’s claim that Officer Roberts could not see his turn signal at the time Salas made
the lane change. Officer Roberts testified that he saw Salas fail to signal (Prelim. Hr’g Tr.,
p.10, L.23 – p.11, L.1; p.30, Ls.11-16; p.35, L.17 – p.36, L.13), and Salas admitted that he
failed to signal (State’s Exhibit A at 09:29:14 – 09:29:15). That Officer Roberts’s view of
what happened matches what Salas admitted had, in fact, happened lends credibility to
Officer Roberts’s testimony that he could and did see Salas fail to use his turn signal when
changing lanes. Accord United States v. Parker, 919 F. Supp.2d 1072, 1081 (E.D. Cal.
2013) (relying on “the fact that marijuana was indeed present” in finding probable cause
to search vehicle based on officer’s testimony that he smelled marijuana because “[t]he
fact that the marijuana was found in the vehicle certainly is consistent with testimony that
it could be smelled”).
In short, the district court found that Officer Roberts saw Salas fail to use his turn
signal when changing lanes on the highway. (R., pp.179-81.) That finding is supported

6

Salas argues the district court erred in finding that Salas admitted he did not use his turn
signal because his immediate response—“What? Did I?” (State’s Exhibit A at 09:29:01 –
09:29:03)—“is not an unequivocal admission.” (Appellant’s brief, p.9.) That is a red
herring. After Officer Roberts explained exactly what he was talking about (i.e., that Salas
failed to use his turn signal when changing lanes in front of the semi), Salas responded
“that’s my fault.” (State’s Exhibit A at 09:29:03 – 09:29:15.) That is the statement the
district court quoted to support Officer Roberts’s testimony. (R., p.180.)
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by substantial evidence in the record—namely, Officer Roberts’s testimony that he saw
Salas fail to signal (Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.10, L.23 – p.11, L.1; p.30, Ls.11-16; p.35, L.17 –
p.36, L.13), which is in turn supported by Salas’s admission that he failed to signal (State’s
Exhibit A at 09:29:14 – 09:29:15). Salas’s “failure to signal for at least five seconds before
changing lanes on a controlled-access highway provided the officer with reasonable
suspicion to perform the stop.” Brooks, 157 Idaho at 894, 341 P.3d at 1263.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment entered upon Salas’s
conditional guilty plea to trafficking heroin.
DATED this 26th day of April, 2018.

/s/ Jeff Nye__________________________
JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General

12

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 26th day of April, 2018, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an electronic copy
to:
LARA E. ANDERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

/s/ Jeff Nye__________________________
JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General
JN/dd
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